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By Alessandro Lizzeri and Leeat Yariv*
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for a 
benevolent government’s intervention. We consider an economy 
where the only “distortion” is agents’ time-inconsistency. We study 
the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining 
to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consump-
tion, when government decisions respond to voters’ preferences via 
the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is high-
est under either full centralization or laissez-faire. Second, intro-
ducing collective action only on consumption decisions yields no 
commitment. Last, individuals’ relative preferences for commitment 
may reverse depending on whether future consumption decisions are 
centralized or not. (JEL D03, D11, D61, D72, D91)
The behavioral economics literature has considered many ways in which individ-uals violate the assumptions of homo economicus—they are prone to various 
belief updating distortions, they selectively expose themselves to particular sources 
of information, they make intertemporal decisions in dynamically inconsistent 
ways, etc.1 These behavioral tendencies generate an efficiency rationale for govern-
ment intervention. A benevolent social planner may want to “assist” individuals in 
making decisions that are ultimately good for them.2 In this paper, we abandon the 
idea of a benevolent planner and instead explicitly model the fact that the political 
process determines the design of policy. We develop a model in which politicians 
seeking election cater to voters who are prone to behavioral biases. We characterize 
settings in which the political process can ameliorate or exacerbate these distortions. 
Our characterization has natural implications for the constitutional scope of govern-
ment activity.
1 Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) contains a number of “second generation” contributions to behav-
ioral economics. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) surveys the experimental evidence on time dis-
counting. DellaVigna (2009) surveys evidence from the field. See also Thaler and Sunstein (2009). 
2 This approach has infiltrated policy in recent years. For instance, in the United States, some discussion of 
social security takes an explicitly paternalistic approach. In the United Kingdom, the Behavioural Insights Team, 
also known as the Nudge Unit, which is partially owned by the government, was put in place with the intention 
of applying insights from behavioral economics and “enabling people to make better choices for themselves” (see 
www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us/). 
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There are of course many types of behavioral distortions, and each of them may 
lead to its own collective action environment. We focus here on self-control problems: 
agents have preferences that display present bias or quasi-hyperbolic  discounting à 
la Phelps and Pollack (1968) and Laibson (1997). These self-control problems can 
lead to phenomena such as procrastination, insufficient savings for retirement,3 and 
harmful obesity and addictions.4 Furthermore, self-control problems can generate a 
demand for commitment (rehab clinics, illiquid assets with costly withdrawals, and 
so on). In principle, a benevolent government could offer commitment instruments 
that would help the electorate overcome some of the harmful symptoms of time-in-
consistency. Our goal is to understand the potential political economy constraints on 
the implementation of such policies.
Specifically, we study a simple Wicksellian tree-cutting problem, under the stan-
dard specification that the tree is growing in value over time. In our baseline setting, 
agents have the option of cutting a tree at period  2, which generates a value of  v 2 , 
or at period  3, which generates a value of  v 3 , where  v 3 >  v 2 . A tension arises since 
agents exhibit present bias. At any period, all future periods are discounted with a 
factor of  β ≤ 1, which is distributed in an arbitrary (but continuous) way in the 
population . Thus, from the perspective of period  1, all agents prefer to wait until 
period  3 to cut the tree. But when period  2 arrives, agents compare an immediate 
value of  v 2 with a discounted value of  β  v 3 and some agents might prefer to cut 
the tree early. This problem has been studied by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), 
who show that time-inconsistent agents tend to consume (cut the tree) inefficiently 
early, and that these agents would find it valuable to commit to cutting the tree later 
(namely, in period 3).
We modify the O’Donoghue-Rabin model to allow for continuous choices and 
costly commitment: by investing resources in period 1, agents can make it costly 
for their future selves to depart from some prespecified plan of action. The more 
investment there is early on in commitment, the more costly it is for future selves 
to cut the tree too early. Indeed, there are many examples in which individuals use 
costly commitment devices. For instance, as of the writing of this paper, there has 
been a collective investment of over $31 million in individual contracts through 
stickk.com. These contracts provide explicit financial punishments for not sticking 
to prespecified commitments, which vary among users and include smoking cessa-
tion, exercise, work targets, etc.5 There are also various ways in which governments 
invest in commitment instruments, most notably ones having to do with retirement 
savings or drug prohibition.6
We outline three different scenarios that vary in terms of which choices (invest-
ment in commitment and/or the timing of consumption) are subject to the political 
process, and which ones are left to individuals. That is, we consider collective action 
3 See, for instance, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998). 
4 E.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000), Gul and Pesendorfer (2007). 
5 See also DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), Ayres (2010), and references therein. 
6 For a description of current public sector pension plans, see Beshears et al. (2011), and for a review of 
alcohol policy in the United States, see Babor et al. (2003). The introduction of graphic warning labels on cig-
arette packs has been the topic of recent controversy and is covered in http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/health/
fda-graphic-tobacco-warnings. 
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pertaining to either or both the commitment decision and the consumption decision, 
in addition to considering a laissez-faire economy in which all decisions are taken 
individually. We assume collective decisions resulting from a political process are 
determined by the outcome of competition between two office-seeking candidates. 
We believe these scenarios offer a simple taxonomy for an array of plausible envi-
ronments. In addition, the characterization of equilibria under the different scenarios 
helps highlight the sensitivity of the resulting welfare levels to the aspects, or tim-
ing, of choices in which collective action comes into play.7
There are three main insights that emerge from our analysis. First, partial inter-
ventions are dominated by either full intervention or no intervention. This is a 
complementarity result between intervention in commitment instruments and inter-
vention in consumption decisions.8 When decision making is fully centralized, 
policies reflect the preferences of the median voter, so welfare levels depend on 
whether the median voter’s bias is relatively small or large. In addition, when only 
some decisions are centralized but others are made privately by the agents, one must 
take into account how agents respond to the government’s interventions: we display 
important ways in which partial interventions can be worse than no intervention.
Second, introducing collective action only on consumption decisions yields no 
commitment. One would expect that collective action on the consumption decision 
provides commitment and is therefore a valuable alternative to costly commitment 
investments. In general, delegating control seems like a good way to get around 
one’s self-control problems. However, this delegated control undermines the incen-
tives to invest in commitment. Thus, the collective consumption decision that is 
taken by the median voter is undertaken with no help from investment in commit-
ment. This immediately implies that individuals with preferences in a neighborhood 
of the median voter are made worse off by government intervention.
Last, individuals’ relative preferences for commitment may reverse depending 
on whether future consumption decisions are centralized or not. An individual with 
high  β has sufficient self-control and may not need to invest in commitment technol-
ogies when she decides on her own consumption. However, when the consumption 
allocation is delegated to an agent with lower  β , she prefers a larger investment in 
commitment, since, from her perspective, the need for commitment becomes larger. 
This effect is stronger the larger the individual’s  β is relative to that of the median 
voter.
I. Related Literature
There are three main components of the setting we study in this paper: agents 
are time-inconsistent; political leaders offer policies directed at addressing those 
individual time inconsistencies; and political leaders are not benevolent, but rather 
select policies that maximize their chances of being elected under majority rule.
7 We abuse terminology by referring to “welfare” as the utilitarian social surplus measured for the period  1 selves 
of the voters. We acknowledge that other criteria are relevant and we discuss this more explicitly in Section V. 
8 Mandating the timing of consumption can be viewed as a metaphor for, e.g., government transfer payments 
in the form of welfare, disability insurance, food stamps, or supplemental security income. See Stephens (2003), 
Shapiro (2005), Dobkin and Puller (2007), and references therein. 
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The three components appear in Hwang and Möllerström (2014) who focus on a 
particular environment of political reforms when voters are time-inconsistent. They 
show that gradualism emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of time-inconsis-
tency. They also show that election of a patient agenda setter can arise in equilib-
rium. Without time-inconsistencies (the first component of our analysis), Ortoleva 
and Snowberg (2015) look at the potential effects of overconfidence on electoral 
outcomes.
The third component, pertaining to politicians who strategize rather than opti-
mize welfare, has been considered by several authors (Benjamin and Laibson 2003; 
Caplan 2007; Glaeser 2006; and Rizzo and Whitman 2009a,b). These authors have 
informally made the point that when government is not run by a benevolent social 
planner but by politicians influenced by voting decisions, it is not clear that govern-
ment intervention is beneficial. In fact, Glaeser and Caplan explicitly make the case 
that, if voters are boundedly rational, the case for limited government may be even 
stronger than in standard models.9
The first two components of our setting have been considered by Krusell, 
Kurus¸çu, and Smith (2002, 2010). They examine government policy for agents who 
suffer self-control problems. In Krusell, Kurus¸çu, and Smith (2002), a neoclassical 
growth model with quasi-hyperbolic consumers is considered. It is shown that, when 
government is benevolent but cannot commit, decentralized allocations are Pareto 
superior. This is due to a general equilibrium effect of savings that exacerbates an 
under-saving problem. Work by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) discusses how endoge-
nously biased beliefs that are chosen by individuals for self-motivation can generate 
a belief in a just (or unjust) world and ultimately affect redistributive politics.
Time-inconsistency and commitment problems faced by politicians, rather than 
the electorate, have been the focus of a large literature in political economy and 
macroeconomics, especially in the context of government debt and monetary policy 
(e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1990, Tabellini and Alesina 1990). In those models, 
voters are time-consistent, but the identity of the decision maker (or decisive voter) 
changes over time, generating time-inconsistent policies.10 There is some evidence 
that this sort of time-inconsistency may have been at the root of the historical design 
of pension systems.11 See also Piguillem and Riboni (2015) and Halac and Yared 
(2014) for the effects of politicians’ time-inconsistencies on fiscal policy.12
9 Bendor et al. (2011) present models of boundedly rational voters that are successful in matching some features 
of elections that are hard to explain with rational-voter models. Diermeier and Li (2015) study the outcomes of 
dynamic majoritarian elections with “behavioral” voters who exhibit some persistence in their voting and forget-
fulness of past political outcomes. 
10 There is also work (e.g., Lagunoff 2008) that shows that if one considers governments that have policy 
preferences and know that they may be kicked out of office with positive probability, endogenous present bias may 
emerge. Related, Jackson and Yariv (2015) illustrate that non-dictatorial representative agents respecting Pareto 
efficiency are inherently time-inconsistent. 
11 Jacobs (2011) provides a comparative history of pension systems, where commitment problems are empha-
sized as an explanation for why some countries chose, or eventually turned to, a pay-as-you-go system. 
12 Our analysis complements this literature by studying the consequences of having agents with heterogeneous 
degrees of time-inconsistency participate in the political process. For instance, as mentioned above, a public pen-
sion system is sometimes defended as a desirable solution to a potential problem of under-saving due to self-control 
problems. However, the design of such a system should then take into account the political constraints generated 
by an electorate composed of voters with these self-control problems. As we show, these constraints are quite 
different from those that have been considered in this literature. Such constraints may affect the choice between a 
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Outside of the political context, there are several papers studying the interactions 
between firms and time-inconsistent consumers (e.g., Gottlieb 2008 and Heidhues 
and Ko˝szegi 2010). To the extent that firms are akin to political competitors, some 
of the underlying forces in these papers are also relevant for the study of political 
processes with a time-inconsistent electorate.
II. A Tree-Cutting Model
A. Preferences and consumption Possibilities
A continuum of agents decides collectively on the timing of consumption. There 
are three periods. In period 1, agents make “commitment” decisions (that we specify 
below). In periods 2 and 3, agents consume fractions of a “tree” of growing value. 
The tree is worth  v 2 in period  2 , and  v 3 in period  3 . We assume that  v 3 >  v 2 > 0 .13 
In period 2, agents choose a fraction  x of the tree to consume in period 2, with  1 − x 
remaining to be consumed in period  3 . We interpret period 3 as the natural moment of 
maturity of the tree so that there is an extra cost in cutting part of the tree in period 2. 
This cost is given by the function  k (x, c) , where  c is a parameter that is determined 
in the first period.
Agents have  β − δ preferences.14 For notational simplicity, we assume there is 
no standard discounting: in the standard notation of  β − δ preferences,  δ = 1 . This 
assumption is effectively without loss of generality for our analysis (as discounting 
can be encoded in the  v sequence of tree values). That is, for any payoffs  u 2 and  u 3 in 
periods  2 and  3, respectively, the assessed utility at time  t, denoted by  u t , is given by
  u 1 = β  u 2 + β  u 3 ,
  u 2 =  u 2 + β  u 3 ,
  u 3 =  u 3. 
Individuals are heterogeneous in their present-bias parameter:  β is distributed 
according to a continuous distribution  g[ β _,  
_ β] with a median parameter denoted 
by  β M .
An agent with parameter  β has a utility at  t = 2 given by
  u 2 (x, c, β) =  v 2 x − k (x, c) + β  v 3 (1 − x) .
In period  1 , a parameter  c is chosen (potentially by a collective action process 
that we soon specify). This parameter raises the cost of cutting the tree early. We 
 pay-as-you-go system and a funded system, the kind of safeguards that are designed into the system, as well as the 
timing and evolution of the system. 
13 Our qualitative results hold in the presence of uncertainty over future tree values. 
14 An alternative framework for approaching the questions that we tackle in this paper is the one of temptation 
and self-control provided by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004). We believe that the main results would have natural 
parallels in the Gul-Pesendorfer environment.
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assume that  
∂ k(x, 0) ______∂ x =  ∂ k(x, 0) ______∂ c = 0 for all  x , so that absent commitment, there 
is no marginal cost of cutting the tree early. We also assume that  
∂ k(x, c) ______∂ x ≥ 0, 
 
 ∂ 2 k(x, c) ______∂ x 2  > 0,  
∂ k(x, c) ______∂ c > 0, and   ∂ 
2 k(x, c) ______∂ x ∂ c > 0. That is, cutting costs are weakly 
increasing and convex in the amount of the tree that is cut  x and in the extent of 
commitment in place, as given by the commitment parameter  c. The marginal cost 
of early consumption is also increasing in  c . Thus,  c serves as a commitment mech-
anism to delay consumption to period  3 . This commitment is costly in period  1 : 
choosing  c costs  i (c) . We assume  i(0) = 0, i′(0) = 0, i′(c) ≥ 0, and  i″(c) > 0 
for all  c .15 ,16 The regularity restrictions we impose on  k(x, c) and  i(c) are sufficient 
for our results and simplify our presentation, but are by no means necessary (in fact, 
in our running example we will drop the requirement that  
∂ k(x, 0) ______∂ x = 0 ).
Utility in period  1 is given by
  u 1 (x, c, β) = β ( v 2 x − k (x, c) ) + β  v 3 (1 − x) − i (c) . 
Agents are assumed to be sophisticated, in the sense that they are aware that 
they are time-inconsistent. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) analyzed the single per-
son decision problem in this environment, by using the notion of perception-perfect 
equilibrium. When agents are sophisticated, they correctly foresee their preferences 
that are specified à la Strotz (1955) and use backwards induction to determine their 
optimal behavior at the outset of the process. We assume sophistication because 
we want to study how the demand for commitment is mediated by the political 
system.17
B. The Political Process
There are two candidates running for office. Candidates are office motivated, 
receiving some positive payoffs from each electoral victory. It will be clear that can-
didates’ time preferences play no role in this model.18 We assume that the electorate 
has no ideological attachment to the candidates.19
We distinguish between three types of environments. These are meant to capture 
different collective action settings and highlight the effects of the timing of collec-
tive decisions on commitment choices.
15 The assumption that  i(0) = 0 is not restrictive. Indeed, assuming  i(0) > 0 is tantamount to assuming there 
is a fixed cost to entering our economy. 
16 For the most part, we will treat the investment in commitment and the associated increase in  k (x, c) as resource 
costs that should be counted in welfare calculations. However, for some applications, such as 401(k) plans, these 
are taxes whose revenues are not a deadweight loss. Such cases can be accommodated simply by reinterpreting the 
resource costs as the pure resources involved in administering the tax. Of course, our welfare calculations would 
then have to be performed differently. Nonetheless, it turns out that our main welfare results are robust to this 
modification. 
17 In the online Appendix we discuss the effects of naivete in our model. 
18 This is not to say that time-inconsistencies cannot take place directly at the political level. As mentioned in the 
discussion of the related literature, there is a body of work that focuses on time-consistency of government policy. 
19 Allowing agents to have idiosyncratic ideological preferences (as in Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) does not 
change any of the results qualitatively. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
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Centralized Commitment, Centralized Choice: Elections occur in periods 
t = 1, 2. At  t = 1 , each candidate offers a platform consisting of a cost  c that 
determines the cost of consumption in period  2 later on. Majority voting determines 
which outcome, and corresponding platform, is elected (we assume that ties are 
 broken with a toss of a coin). If the platform  c i is implemented, all agents experience 
an immediate commitment cost of  i( c i ) at  t = 1. At  t = 2, the candidates each 
offer a fraction  x l of the tree to be consumed in period  2 and majority rule (with ran-
dom breaking of ties) determines which policy is implemented. If an amount  x j of 
the tree is consumed at  t = 2, an agent with taste parameter  β receives the value of 
 v 2  x j + β  v 3 (1 −  x j ). All agents experience an immediate cost of  k( x j ,  c i ). 
Decentralized Commitment, Centralized Choice: At  t = 1, agents choose indi-
vidually the parameter  c that will induce their commitment-breaking costs at time 
t = 2 , the cost of which is immediate and given by  i(c) . At  t = 2, the candidates 
each offer a fraction  x l of the tree to be consumed in period  2 and majority rule (with random breaking of ties) determines which policy  x j is implemented for the 
entire population. An individual with taste parameter  β who chose a commitment 
parameter of  c at  t = 1 receives a net value of  v 2  x j + β  v 3 (1 −  x j ) and experiences 
an immediate cost of  k( x j , c). 
Centralized Commitment, Decentralized Choice: Elections occur only in period 
t = 1 , when each candidate offers a platform consisting of a commitment parame-
ter  c i involving an immediate commitment cost of  i( c i ) . Majority voting determines 
which outcome, and corresponding platform, is elected (again, ties are broken ran-
domly). At  t = 2, each of the individual agents decides what fraction  x of the tree to 
consume. An individual with taste parameter  β who chooses to consume a fraction 
x of the tree at  t = 2 receives a net value of  v 2 x + β  v 3 (1 − x) and experiences an 
immediate cost of  k(x,  c i ). 
In what follows, we analyze the outcomes of a fully decentralized economy in 
addition to each of the above settings in turn. Throughout, we often use the shorthand 
of DD, CC, DC, and CD for the fully decentralized, fully centralized, decentralized 
commitment and centralized choice, and centralized commitment and decentralized 
choice systems, respectively.
For each political process, we consider voters’ (pure) strategies that are measur-
able with respect to the Lebegue-Stieltjes measure induced by  g . An equilibrium is 
then a profile of such strategies in which each individual best responds to population 
play. We note that this requires fairly limited knowledge on the part of individuals 
regarding overall population play—when decisions are decided collectively, indi-
viduals need only know the median choice in order to best respond.20
20 We do not model how this knowledge comes about. While a standard assumption in equilibrium analysis, it 
may not be a trivial assumption from an applied perspective. We make this assumption for two reasons. First, the 
paper can be interpreted as showing that even when voters are as sophisticated as possible, certain institutions can 
still exploit their behavioral biases. Second, were we to relax this assumption, we would need to take a stand on 
the specification of “naive” beliefs held by voters, which would inherently be somewhat ad hoc, as the empirical 
literature is still not rich with results identifying such beliefs. 
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All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
C. Discussion of the Model
Our model of collective action builds on the individual decision-making prob-
lem proposed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), who first considered a version 
of the type of tree-cutting decision problem analyzed in this paper. We extend this 
model in two ways and then introduce collective action. First, we allow the agents 
to invest in commitment or self-control. This is reasonable as there are many cases 
in which the government or individuals can take actions to restrain their future 
selves (401(k) plans, rehab programs, Weight Watchers, internal psychological 
mechanisms). If commitment were free, all agents would commit themselves 
to later consumption and there would effectively be no self-control problem. 
Consequently, decentralized decisions would lead to first-best outcomes in which 
all agents would efficiently and fully delay their consumption. We therefore intro-
duce commitment costs to allow for a nontrivial cost-benefit trade-off that also 
creates room for potentially beneficial government intervention. A second, more 
technical modification of the model presented by O’Donoghue and Rabin pertains 
to their assumption that agents only choose when to cut the tree but cannot cut 
fractions of it. This is tantamount to a special case of our model in which  k(x, c) 
is linear.21
We now discuss some features of our model and their limitations.
Political Intervention: We have chosen to study four scenarios that differ in their 
degree of centralization of choices. These are natural scenarios, and we show below 
that it is important to distinguish between government action over consumption, 
such as government transfer payments in the form of welfare, disability insurance, 
food stamps, or supplemental security income, and government action over commit-
ment, such as 401(k) pension plans that penalize withdrawals before retirement age, 
prohibition, cigarette ad campaigns, etc.22 Furthermore, comparing laissez-faire to 
various degrees of government centralization is an old question in economics and it 
is useful to understand how centralization affects outcomes in a world with no other 
reason for government intervention other than “behavioral” distortions. There are, 
of course, many other scenarios that can be studied. We discuss some of these in the 
online Appendix.23
Format of Collective Action: We model collective action as elections of 
office-motivated candidates. We do so in part because this is the most standard 
way to approach political economy models, and is therefore a good starting point 
to explore collective self-control. However, the main forces behind our results 
21 This special case introduces some important technical complications within the analysis of the centralized 
commitment-decentralized choice scenario as preferences are no longer single peaked. This case is discussed in the 
online Appendix. 
22 The model is not tailored to study addiction. However, the key force of commitment to delay undesirable 
temptations for immediate gratification is relevant for addiction as well. 
23 In the online Appendix, we also consider endogenous turnout. 
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are likely to be present in several alternative specifications of the political sys-
tem. Two particular natural extensions (discussed in the online Appendix) are the 
following. First, one could think of collective action generating more targeted 
policies that affect individuals differentially, say in the form of commitment 
subsidies or consumption caps. Second, throughout our analysis, we take the 
commitment technology itself (namely, the functions  i(c) and  k(x, c) ) as exoge-
nous. While some of the implied costs may be psychological and rather nonmal-
leable, others may stem from institutions and could be an object of political choice 
as well.24
We intentionally ignore externalities among agents other than those induced by 
the collective-choice process in order to isolate the forces that emerge from col-
lective action through time-inconsistency itself. However, studying the interactions 
between self-control problems and other reasons for collective action would cer-
tainly be interesting.
Commitment Technologies: We assume that the commitment technologies faced 
by individuals and by the government are identical. There is no empirical reason to 
make this assumption: the relative effectiveness of commitment by the government 
or by individuals will depend on the specific application. However, assuming iden-
tical technologies is a useful benchmark. In the online Appendix, we consider some 
implications of different commitment technologies accessible to the government 
and the agents.
Self-Control Problems in Elections: The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model 
imposes a link between self-control problems and a difference between present- 
and future-period preferences. In that respect, what accounts for the “present” as 
opposed to the “future” is crucial for the scope of self-control problems and for 
evaluating potential policies that attempt to limit their impact. For a detailed discus-
sion and description of empirical research supporting the relevance of self-control 
problems for the voting context, see Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015).
III. Decentralized Outcomes
Before inspecting the impacts of collective action on commitment decisions, we 
describe each agent’s individual decisions. This analysis corresponds to the case in 
which all decisions are made in a decentralized fashion.
Given the value of  c determined in the first period, in the second period the agent’s 
problem is given by:
  max 
x
    u 2 (x, c, β) ⇔  max x    v 2 x − k (x, c) + β  v 3 (1 − x) . 
24 We also note that our results carry through almost directly to a citizen-candidate model (under plurality rule) 
of collective action, for moderate candidacy costs. In that case, in all the scenarios we consider, as in proposition 1 in 
Osborne and Slivinski (1996), one citizen would put forward her candidacy and select the policies we characterize. 
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Let  x (c, β) denote the solution to this problem:










β <  ( v 2  −   ∂ k (1, c)  ______∂ x ) / v 3 
      ( v 2  −  β  v 3 )  =   ∂ k (x (c, β) , c) _________ ∂ x    ( v 2  −   ∂ k (1, c) ______∂ x  ) / v 3 ≤ β <  ( v 2  −   ∂ k (0, c)  ______∂ x ) / v 3  
0  β ≥  ( v 2  −   ∂ k (0, c)  ______∂ x ) / v 3 
. 
Intuitively, whenever the agent either experiences less present bias or higher 
marginal costs of immediate consumption, delay is more likely. At the extremes, 
if marginal costs of cutting the whole tree are not too high (namely,  ∂ k (1, c)  ______∂ x <  v 2 ), 
very impatient agents will not delay any consumption. Virtuous agents, for whom 
the marginal costs of very little early consumption outweigh the benefits, will cut 
the entire tree in period  3. The monotonicity of the consumption function  x(c, β) is 
captured by the following lemma, which will be useful for our analysis of the col-
lective-choice settings.
LEMMA 1 (Consumption Monotonicity): The fraction of the tree consumed in 
period  2,  x(c, β), is decreasing in both  c and  β .
The first-period problem can be written as
  max 
c
    u 1 (x, c, β) ⇔  max c   β  v 3 + x (c, β)  (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) − βk (x (c, β) , c) − i (c) .
Let  c (β) be the solution of this problem. We want to understand the dependence of 
the commitment parameter  c(β) on  β , which will be an essential input into the col-
lective-action problem.
In order to glean some intuition on the dependence of  c on  β, consider the case in 
which  x(c, β) is interior and differentiable with respect to  c. Notice that
  
∂ u 1  ____∂ c =  
∂ x (c, β)  _______∂ c β ( ( v 2 −  v 3 ) −  ∂ k (x (c, β) , c)   ___________∂ x ) − β  ∂ k (x (c, β) , c)   ___________∂ c − i′ (c) . 
In contrast to the standard dynamic optimization problem with geometric dis-
counters, the envelope condition fails and the indirect effect on period  2 consump-
tion does not disappear. Indeed, substituting the second-period first-order conditions, 
we obtain
(2)  ∂ u 1  ____∂ c = − β ( ∂ x (c, β)  _______∂ c ( (1 − β)  v 3 ) +  ∂ k (x (c, β) , c)   ___________∂ c ) − i′ (c) . 
The benefit of commitment is captured by the term  −β  ∂ x (c, β)  ______∂ c ( (1 − β)  v 3 ) . This 
term is increasing in the degree of present bias and captures the fact that the period-1 
self and the period-2 self disagree on the value of cutting the tree in period 2.
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There are several effects of changes in  β on the optimal choice of  c . As  β 
increases, more weight is put on the future, pushing for more early commitment 
investment. Furthermore, the fraction of the tree consumed in period  2,  x (c, β) , 
is smaller, leading to a smaller marginal cost  
∂ k (x (c, β) , c)  _________∂ c tomorrow. Nonetheless, 
as  β becomes larger, time-inconsistency becomes less relevant, so the benefit of 
 (1 − β)  v 3 is smaller. When  β is close to zero or close to   v 2  __ v 3 , period 1 investment will 
be zero, so investment is not monotone. Intuitively, agents for whom time-inconsis-
tency is very severe foresee that reasonably priced commitments will not save them 
from excessive consumption in period 2 and therefore acquire limited commitment. 
On the other side of the spectrum, agents who are virtuous (characterized by high  β ) 
do not suffer from great temptation in period 2, and therefore do not require extreme 
commitment to enable them to postpone consumption. In particular, recall that when 
β ≥  v 2 / v 3 , agents choose  x (c , β) = 0 for all  c so their optimal investment in com-
mitment is zero:  c (β) = 0 for all  β ≥  v 2 / v 3 .
Figure 1 illustrates a case in which  c(β) is concave between  β _ and   v 2  __ v 3 in this region 
and only one maximum exists. This holds, for instance, when the cost functions are 
quadratic.25 As highlighted by the figure, the greatest commitment constraints are 
chosen by individuals with moderate levels of time-inconsistency. 
IV. Electoral Outcomes
We now turn to inspect the effects of collective action on agents’ choices. We 
start by analyzing the case in which only the choice of commitment levels is done 
25 In general, however,  c(β) may achieve several local maxima between  β _ and   v 2  __ v 3 . 
Figure 1. Commitment for the Quadratic Case
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through an electoral process. We then proceed to a case in which both commitment 
and the timing of consumption are decided upon collectively.
Recall that the support of the preference distribution  g is  [ β _,  
_ β] and that  ∂ k(x, 0) ______∂ c = 0 
for all  x. Unless otherwise mentioned, we will assume that  β _ > 0 from now on. We 
will also denote  β ∗ =  v 2 / v 3 . From equation (2), together with Lemma 1, it fol-
lows that for all  β ∈ [ β _,  β ∗ ), the optimal commitment level is positive,  c(β) > 0. 
Denote by  c ∗ ≡ c( β _). We will focus on what we term regular environments.
DEFINITION (Regular Environments): An environment is regular if  ∂ k (1, c)  ______∂ x ≥  v 2 
for all  c ≥  c ∗ . 
Regularity assures that preferences for commitment are single-peaked. Using our 
discussion above, we have the following.
LEMMA 2 (Commitment Choices in Regular Environments): in regular environ-
ments, for any individual of type  β,  x(c(β), β) < 1. in particular,  c(β) > 0 for all 
β ∈ [ β _,  β ∗ ). Furthermore, preferences over commitment levels are single-peaked.
That is, regularity assures that individuals, left to their own devices, would choose 
commitment levels that are effective to some extent. This simplifies our analysis 
substantially. We discuss the analysis of environments that are not regular in the 
online Appendix.
A. collective commitment with Decentralized choice
In this setting, the commitment parameter  c is determined collectively. From the 
point of view of an agent of type  β , the voting problem is determined as  follows. From 
the analysis of the private decision problem of an agent of type  β , if a  commitment 
parameter  c is chosen, and subsequent choices are made optimally by the agent, 
period  1 utility is given by
(3)  u 1 (x (c, β) , c, β) = β  v 3 + x (c, β)  (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) − βk (x (c, β) , c) − i (c) . 
Thus, the agent votes for candidate 1, offering commitment  c 1 , over candidate 2 , 
who offers commitment  c 2 , whenever
  u 1 (x ( c 1 , β) ,  c 1 , β) >  u 1 (x ( c 2 , β) ,  c 2 , β) . 
PROPOSITION 1: There is a unique pure strategy equilibrium of the collective com-
mitment game in which both candidates offer a platform  c cD . Furthermore, when  c(β) 
has a unique local maximum in  ( β _,   v 2  __ v 3 ) , the platform  c cD corresponds to the ideal 
policy for a voter of type  β cD , where  β cD is higher than the median  β,  β cD ≥  β M .
The quadratic case in the example above is useful in illustrating the intuition under-
lying Proposition 1. Consider Figure 1. If  1 − g(  v 2  __ v 3 ) ≥ 1/2, there is a  majority of 
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agents who prefer no commitment and the equilibrium commitment parameter is 
naturally  c cD = 0, which coincides with that preferred by the median. Otherwise, 
for every  c ̃ > 0, define  β L ( c ̃) and  β H ( c ̃) such that  c ̃ is their ideal point, i.e.,  c( β L ( c ̃) )  = c( β H ( c ̃) ) =  c ̃. All agents with preference parameters below  β L ( c ̃) and above β H ( c ̃) prefer commitment parameters lower than  c ̃, while agents with preference 
parameters between  β L ( c ̃) and  β H ( c ̃) prefer commitment parameters above  c ̃. 
In particular, the equilibrium commitment parameter  c cD is chosen so that 
these two classes of agents are of equal proportions. That is,  g( β L ( c cD ) ) + 
 (1 − g( β H ( c cD ) )) = 1/2. By construction,  β M ∈  ( β L ( c cD ) ,  β H ( c cD ) ) and the 
result follows. In fact, note that in this case, the equilibrium commitment level cor-
responds to a voter of type  β cD that is strictly higher than the median,  β cD >  β M . 
In this case, it also corresponds to the commitment level of a voter of type  β ̃ cD that 
is strictly lower than the median,  β ̃ cD <  β M . Importantly, when  c(β) has a unique 
local maximum, this construction implies that equilibrium commitment is lower 
than the ideal point of the median  β . That is,  c cD ≤ c( β M ). 26 We stress, however, 
that Proposition 1 is still a type of a median-voter result, in that half of the electorate 
prefers a commitment level lower than  c cD and half of the electorate prefers a com-
mitment level higher than  c cD . Since individual preferences for commitment are 
non-monotone in the preference type, the resulting equilibrium commitment need 
not correspond to the individual with median preference parameter  β M .
The construction of the equilibrium level of commitment can be adapted to envi-
ronments in which  c(β) entails several local maxima; it is only the relation to the 
median agent’s preferred level of commitment that hinges on  c(β) having a unique 
maximum. However, the construction does rely on all agents having single-peaked 
preferences with respect to the commitment parameter  c. Indeed, in this case, agents 
with high taste parameter  β prefer no investment in commitment, while all others 
prefer a positive amount of commitment. The condition on  
∂ k (1, c)  ______∂ x assures that even 
individuals with very low parameters  β benefit from some level of commitment.27
B. collective commitment with centralized choice
We now discuss the case in which the second period choice is also taken via 
collective action. Two office-motivated candidates,  1 and  2 , respectively offer plat-
forms  x 1 and  x 2 in the second period.
From the analysis of individual choices, recall that (1) provides the second period 
optimal choice  x(c, β) for any given commitment parameter  c selected in period  1. 
From Lemma 1,  x (c, β) is decreasing in  β . It is then clear that for any given choice 
of  c in the first period, both candidates will choose to offer the ideal policy of the 
median voter  β M . Thus, the second period choice will be  x (c,  β M ) .
26 The construction also implies that median preserving spreads of the distribution  g would lead to lower equi-
librium commitment levels. 
27 We note that it would suffice to assume that  
∂ k(1, c) ______∂ x ≥  v 2 only for  c > 0 , which is satisfied by our running 
quadratic example. 
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We can now step back and consider a generic voter’s first-period utility in this 
scenario.
(4)  u 1 (x (c,  β M ) , c, β) = β  v 3 + x (c,  β M )  (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) − βk (x (c,  β M ) , c) − i (c) . 
Since  x (c,  β M ) is fixed for all  β , the choice of commitment in the first period is 
driven by the commitment desire of an agent of median taste parameter  β M . Denote 
by  c(β,  β M ) the (constrained) optimal commitment parameter for an agent of taste  β, 
foreseeing the second-period choice being determined according to the taste of the 
median parameter  β M . As it turns out,  c(β,  β M ) is monotonic in  β, with individuals 
who care more about future consumption preferring greater investment in commit-
ment, as illustrated in the following lemma.
LEMMA 3 (Constrained Commitment Monotonicity): The optimal constrained 
commitment  c(β,  β M ) is increasing in  β .
Note that the monotonicity in  β of desired commitment is in contrast with the 
analysis of both the fully decentralized scenario as well as of the centralized com-
mitment with decentralized choice scenario. The logic for this is the following. The 
value of investment in commitment is now in reducing incentives for the median 
agent to cut the tree early. This is particularly valuable for the high- β agents.
Lemma 3 implies that it is median preferences that determine first-period choices 
as well. This is captured in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: When both commitment and consumption are chosen collec-
tively, equilibrium outcomes coincide with those chosen optimally by agents with 
the median taste parameter  β M .
It is also interesting to highlight how optimal constrained commitment  c(β,  β M ) 
changes as  β M changes. Indeed, the marginal benefit of commitment  (1 −  β M )  v 3 is 
higher when  β M is lower and so for the case of interior solutions, the following holds.
Remark: The optimal constrained commitment  c(β,  β M ) is decreasing in  β M . 
Figure 2 depicts  c (β,  β M ) for different values of  β M ∈  ( β _,   v 2  __ v 3 ) . 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the optimal desired amount of commitment  c(β,  β M ) is 
increasing in  β and decreasing in  β M . Notice, however, that the equilibrium level of 
commitment is given by  c( β M ,  β M ) ≡ c( β M ), which is not monotonic.
We can now compare the level of commitment in the two collective-action sce-
narios. When  c(β) has a unique maximum, Proposition 1 assures that the platform 
c cD chosen in equilibrium corresponds to the ideal policy for a voter of type  β cD , 
where  β cD is higher than the median  β,  β cD ≥  β M . Furthermore, the construction 
of the proof of Proposition 1 (extending that appearing for the quadratic case in 
Example 1) illustrates that  c( β cD ) ≤ c( β M ) when  c(β) has a unique local maxi-
mum. This discussion can be summarized by the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 3: Assume that  c(β) has a unique local maximum in  ( β _,   v 2  __ v 3 ) . Then 
the equilibrium choice of commitment is higher under full centralization than in the 
decentralized choice scenario.
When  c(β) has multiple local maxima, the comparison between the equilibrium 
commitment levels generated by full centralization and decentralized choice is 
inconclusive and, in principle, can go either way.
C. Decentralized commitment with centralized choice
We now consider the case in which individuals privately invest in commitment, 
but in period 2 there is an election that determines the time for consumption for all 
individuals.
PROPOSITION 4: in an equilibrium of the decentralized commitment, centralized 
choice scenario, all voters choose  c = 0 .
The intuition for this result is the following. Each agent is powerless to affect 
choices in the second period. Investment in commitment is only useful if it affects 
the choice in period  2 . But, this choice is made collectively, and the probability that 
an agent is pivotal in period 2 is zero when there is an infinite number of agents. 
Thus, the incentive to invest in commitment also disappears.28
28 With a finite voting population, the no commitment equilibrium still exists, but equilibria with positive invest-
ment may exist. In those, an exact majority invests in the private (decentralized) commitment. In that case, any 
individual choosing  c = 0 is best responding since she gains her ideal commitment choice in period  t = 2 ; if an 
investing individual deviates to a lower commitment level, she becomes pivotal at  t = 2 ; therefore, choosing the 
optimal decentralized level of commitment is optimal for her. However, the zero investment equilibrium is the only 
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This result suggests the following observation. Suppose that in the decentral-
ized setting, we observe a median individual making responsible choices in period 
2 . One may naively conclude that centralizing consumption would be beneficial 
because it would lead to responsible choices for the entire population, including 
those who were choosing irresponsibly. However, our result shows that such partial 
centralization would undermine the incentive to commit that, in turn, allowed the 
median person to choose responsibly in period 3. For instance, if  β M <   v 2  __ v 3 , then 
in this scenario the median choice would be to consume the entire tree in period 2. 
This discussion suggests that partial centralization may be harmful: centralization of 
consumption choices should be accompanied by centralization of commitment. We 
discuss this intuition more formally in the next section.
It is also interesting to note that the zero investment result in this proposition 
still holds in the case of a homogeneous population. This is notable since in all of 
the previous scenarios, outcomes for a homogeneous population would coincide 
with those generated by a fully decentralized, laissez-faire system. Indeed, in our 
other settings, the key ingredient determining outcomes is the identity of the deci-
sive agent. However, in the setting where only consumption is centralized, the deci-
sion-making process itself undermines the incentive to commit. It leads to no one 
investing in commitment regardless of the distribution of preferences and, in turn, 
may harm the population as a whole.
D. comparison of outcomes
Our analysis so far illustrates that individuals’ relative preferences for commitment 
may reverse depending on whether future consumption decisions are centralized or 
not. We showed that, under some regularity assumptions, commitment investment 
is larger in the scenario with full centralization relative to the scenario where only 
commitment is centralized. Importantly, there is no investment in commitment in the 
case of decentralized commitment and centralized choice. Therefore, that scenario 
leads to the lowest aggregate investment in commitment.
The comparison between full decentralization and the systems involving cen-
tralized commitment choices is instead ambiguous. One obvious case in which the 
fully decentralized outcome leads to higher investment in commitment is when the 
median voter is virtuous:  β M ≥   v 2  __ v 3 . In this case, all scenarios with some degree 
of centralization of commitment decisions generate no commitment investment, 
whereas some investment takes place in the fully decentralized scenario as long 
as there is a positive mass of individuals who are not virtuous. Finally, in order 
to construct an example in which centralized commitment leads to higher invest-
ment, consider a case where the median voter  β M is such that  c ( β M ) is maximal (i.e., β M ∈ arg max c(β) ). In this case, the fully centralized scenario leads to the maximal 
one that is robust in the following sense. Consider a finite population of voters drawn from a distribution  g (β, ε) 
so that the identity of the median voter is uncertain. In this variation of the model, as the number of voters grows 
large, the probability that any given voter is pivotal in the second period becomes negligible. Hence, the benefit from 
investing in commitment converges to zero. 
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investment that would be chosen by anybody in the population. All other scenarios 
lead to lower investment in the aggregate.
Figure 3 summarizes the resulting second-period consumption levels under the 
different systems. Were individuals able to freely commit, they would all consume 
the tree in full in period  3 , and the first-best second-period consumption would be 
nil for all preference types. When the median agent is not virtuous (corresponding 
to the left panel of Figure 3), centralizing consumption leads to greater early con-
sumption at least for some agents (when commitment decisions are centralized), if 
not all (when commitment decisions are decentralized). However, the first-best level 
is achieved whenever the median agent is virtuous and there is collective action on 
consumption decisions (see the right panel of Figure 3). Decisions are then dele-
gated to an agent who can resist temptations to consume early. We next analyze the 
welfare consequences of the different systems, which will echo these observations.
V. Welfare Consequences
We now turn to the welfare consequences of each of the political processes ana-
lyzed above. In the case of time-inconsistent agents, the appropriate welfare cri-
terion is debatable.29 We start by measuring welfare as the utility of first-period 
agents. We later turn to consider period-0 welfare assessments.
A. Period-1 Welfare
We denote by  Π DD (g),  Π Dc (g),  Π cD (g), and  Π cc (g) the expected utilitarian 
welfare corresponding to the fully decentralized, decentralized-centralized, cen-
tralized-decentralized, and centralized-centralized systems, respectively, when the 
underlying preference distribution is given by  g . We will at times abuse notation 
and drop the argument of the welfare function when clarity is not compromised. For 
29 For a discussion, see Bernheim and Rangel (2009). 
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presentation simplicity, we assume that  k(x, 0) = 0 for all  x so that no commitment 
leads agents to experience no costs of early consumption.
The main idea behind our comparison of the welfare generated by the four insti-
tutions that we consider is that of delegation. Centralization effectively allows del-
egation of specific decisions to a particular individual. In the setting of our model 
without any externalities, standard geometric discounters would have no reason to 
delegate and so laissez-faire would dominate all other systems. For individuals with 
self-control problems, from the perspective of period 1 welfare, we must distin-
guish between delegation of consumption choices and delegation of investment in 
commitment. On the one hand, all individuals benefit from delegating consumption 
decisions to individuals who are more virtuous than them (higher  β ) and harmed 
by delegating decisions to individuals who have worse self-control (lower  β ). On 
the other hand, no period-1 self benefits from delegating the commitment decision 
because there is no self-control problem in period 1.
We start by showing that partial centralization, i.e., mandating only one decision 
(either commitment or consumption) is dominated by either full centralization or 
laissez-faire.
PROPOSITION 5: For all preference distributions, either full centraliza-
tion or full decentralization are welfare maximizing. That is,  max { Π DD ,  Π cc } 
≥ max { Π cD ,  Π Dc } . 
The proof of this result is straightforward. Note first that, under laissez-faire, 
individuals can always emulate the decisions generated by the centralized- 
decentralized system: they can choose a commitment level of  c cD . Therefore, 
  Π DD ≥  Π cD . In fact, all agents but those who individually choose  c cD strictly ben-
efit from having all decisions decentralized. Recall that  β ∗ was defined as the thresh-
old preference parameter corresponding to agents who are just indifferent between 
postponing consumption or consuming immediately in period 2 given zero commit-
ment,   v 2 =  β ∗  v 3 . By Proposition 4, in the decentralized-centralized system there 
is zero investment in commitment. If the median voter is not sufficiently virtuous 
( β M <  β ∗ ) this leads to  x = 1 : full consumption of the tree in period  2 because 
early consumption comes at no cost,  
∂ k(x, 0) ______∂ x = 0 . In this case, welfare is higher 
under laissez-faire: all agents with preference parameter  β <  β ∗ can do no worse, 
and all virtuous agents with preference parameters  β ≥  β ∗ manage to delay con-
sumption to period  3 even if they do not invest in commitment. It follows that 
when  β M <  β ∗ ,  Π DD ≥  Π Dc . Suppose now that the median voter is virtuous, 
 β M ≥  β ∗ . In this case, under both the decentralized-centralized and centralized- 
centralized system, there is no investment in commitment and all consumption is 
delayed to period 3, so that, in this case,  Π cc =  Π Dc . The result of Proposition 5 
holds, in fact, for more general environments than the special one we study here (see 
Section VI).
The comparison between the fully centralized system and a laissez-faire economy 
depends on the distribution of preferences. Roughly speaking, when the median  β 
is high, centralization is beneficial because a centralized political process allows all 
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agents to delegate choice to a virtuous voter who commits to efficient actions at low 
costs. On the other hand, when the median voter is prone to a strong present-bias 
(low  β M ), collective decisions lead to bad outcomes: low investment in commitment 
and high levels of early consumption. In these cases, the decentralized system per-
forms better because at least some of the virtuous voters do well: they are not bound 
by the self-control problems of a low median  β . The following result provides suffi-
cient conditions for ranking the two systems.
PROPOSITION 6:
 (i) If  g ( β ∗ ) > 0 , and  β M ≥  β ∗ , then full centralization is best:  Π cc (g) 
>  Π DD (g). 
 (ii) Consider a sequence of distributions  { g n } n=1 ∞ with corresponding medi-
ans  { β M n } n=1 ∞ . If there exists  β ̃ >  β _ such that  { g n ( β ̃ )} is uniformly bounded 
below  1 and  lim n→∞   β M n =  β _, then there exists  n ∗ such that for all  n >  n ∗ , 
laissez-faire is best:  Π DD ( g n ) >  Π cc ( g n ) .
Part (i) of this result says that a sufficient condition for full centralization to be 
best is that the median voter is sufficiently high so that no commitment is required 
to ensure no early consumption. Of course, this condition is not necessary: for 
instance, if the median voter is characterized by a preference parameter slightly 
lower than  β ∗ , a moderate amount of investment in commitment ensures almost no 
early consumption.
Part (ii) is more involved: the condition on the sequence of distributions rules 
out the possibility that there is a sequence such that  β M converges to  β _ but there is 
a vanishing mass of agents whose preference parameter  β is larger than  β M . In such 
cases centralization may still be best.
Proposition 6 is effectively a delegation result. When the median voter is suf-
ficiently virtuous, the electorate benefits from delegating decisions to the median 
voter.30
An example is useful in visually illustrating how the different political processes 
fare in terms of welfare as a function of the underlying preference distribution in the 
electorate.
Example 3 (Quadratic Costs—Welfare Comparisons): Consider the case of 
 k (x, c) =  (c +  v 2 )   x 2  __2 and  i (c) =   c 2  __2 and suppose that  g is a triangular distribu-
tion with a peak at  d ∈ (0, 1). Figure 4 depicts the welfare levels generated by the 
different processes as a function of the median agent’s preferences when  v 2 = 1 , 
30 The idea that delegation to an agent whose preferences are misaligned with society’s might be useful appears 
in other types of environments as well, most notably in the macroeconomic literature condoning the use of central 
banks who do not share the social objective and weigh relatively heavily inflation-rate stabilitization; see Rogoff 
(1985) and the literature that followed. 
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 v 3 = 3/2, and  i(c) = 0.0005 c 2 .31 , 32 We use the fully decentralized setting as a 
baseline for comparison. Figure 4 illustrates the way that the four  scenarios compare 
in terms of first-period welfare. Full centralization reaches the highest welfare when 
the median  β is high. Full centralization and decentralized commitment-central-
ized choice have the same level of welfare when the median is above  2/3 because 
2/3 =  v 2 / v 3 for our parameters, and in these cases, no commitment is neces-
sary to induce zero tree-cutting in period 2. However, the decentralized commit-
ment-centralized choice scenario is a lot worse for lower values of the median  β . 
When the median  β is lower, full decentralization leads to the best outcome, with 
centralized commitment-decentralized choice a close second. The reason why the 
comparison between these scenarios becomes much more favorable to full central-
ization (especially relative to the setting in which only commitment is centralized) 
for high values of median  β is that when the median  β is high there is no commitment 
in equilibrium. Under decentralized choice, this harms the individuals with lower  β . 
One interesting aspect of the comparison among welfare levels is that commitment 
and consumption, are “complementary”: either full centralization or full decentral-
ization generate the greatest levels of welfare, whereas partial centralization yields 
inferior welfare results.
31 For a triangular distribution with a peak at  d, the corresponding median is given by:
  β M =  {  √ 
__ d/ √ __ 2   d ≥ 1/2  
1 −  √ ___ 1 − d/ √ __ 2  d < 1/2. 
32 Note that our utility specification implies a weight of  1 on period- 1 intstantaneous utility and a weight of  β 
on each of period- 2 and period- 3 instantaneous utilities. In Figure 4, we normalize the utility of each agent with 
preference parameter  β by  1 + 2β. 
 Figure 4. Welfare Comparison for Different Median Preferences
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It is also instructive to compare the welfare resulting from our political processes 
to that generated by an economy that does not allow for commitment. Denote by  Π S 
the expected first-period utilitarian surplus absent any commitment instruments:33
(5)  Π S =  ∫ 
0
  β ∗   β  v 2  _____ 
1 + 2β dg (β) +  ∫  β ∗  1  β  v 3  _____ 1 + 2β dg (β) . 
It is easy to construct an example where the welfare generated by some central-
ized political system is worse than  Π S . For instance, if there is a substantial mass 
of virtuous agents and the median  β M is very low,  Π S >  Π cc . In other words, if 
the constitution makes a bad delegation decision, welfare is even lower than in an 
economy with no possibility of investing in commitment. However, it is easy to see 
that  Π S ≤ max { Π DD ,  Π cc } . In fact,  Π S ≤  Π DD : under laissez-faire, agents can 
always emulate the no commitment environment by choosing a commitment level 
of  0 . Thus, whenever a positive commitment level is chosen by an individual, the 
induced first-period utility is higher than that absent commitment.
B. Period-0 Welfare
It is also useful to consider the welfare comparison among the various scenarios 
from the point of view of period 0, before the commitment choice is made.
Period- 0 utility for an agent of type  β is given by
(6)  u 0 (x (c, β) , c, β) = β { v 3 + x (c, β)  ( v 2 −  v 3 ) − k (x (c, β) , c) − i (c) } . 
Comparing expressions (6) and (3) makes it clear that there is an important dif-
ference between the period-0 and the period-1 perspective: from the point of view of 
the period-0 self, the commitment choices themselves are now subject to self-control 
problems. The main consequence of this for our analysis of collective action is that, 
in contrast to our previous discussion, the period-0 self may now have the incentive 
to delegate commitment decisions because her period-1 self “under-commits.”
Despite these differences, an analogous result to Proposition 6 still holds when 
considering welfare in period 0: if the median voter is sufficiently virtuous, mandat-
ing decisions, or delegating them to the virtuous median voter through full central-
ization, is beneficial relative to a laissez-faire setting; in contrast, if the median voter 
has a high degree of present bias (low  β ), then laissez-faire is better.
With respect to partial centralization, notice first that full centralization Pareto 
dominates (for all preference parameters  β ) the decentralized commitment, cen-
tralized consumption system. Indeed, both systems generate a uniform profile of 
commitment and consumption for all agents. Therefore, all period-0 selves, regard-
less of their preference parameter  β, rank the two systems alike. However, the agent 
with median preference parameter  β M is certainly better off in the fully centralized 
system, which in turn implies that all agents are.
33 As in the example, the division by  1 + 2β is a normalization of agents’ utilities, so that weights of instanta-
neous utilities in period  1 always sum up to  1 . 
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The comparison with the centralized commitment, decentralized consumption sys-
tem is more intricate. As mentioned above, in period 0 agents can no longer emulate 
period-1 commitment decisions when considering a laissez-faire economy, and for 
particular settings in which median preferences are not virtuous enough, mandating 
commitment alone may be superior to both full centralization and full decentraliza-
tion. For example, suppose there are three groups of agents: ones that are rather impa-
tient, ones that are moderately impatient, and ones that experience no self-control 
issues. Suppose further that the group of moderately impatient agents forms a major-
ity, so whenever commitment is mandated, they dictate the level of commitment. Full 
centralization may be suboptimal if the very patient individuals are sufficiently prom-
inent: they would end up paying a significant cost for commitment and experience 
early cutting of the tree that they would not have experienced had they been able to 
decide for themselves. Full decentralization may not be optimal since, now, the very 
impatient individuals may strictly benefit from the moderately patient agents forcing 
them to commit more substantially. Indeed, from a period-0 perspective, the costs of 
commitment are effectively reduced by a factor of  β . If the very impatient individuals 
are sufficiently prominent as well, mandating commitment alone can be optimal.
Having said this, it is difficult to characterize general conditions in which the cen-
tralized commitment, decentralized consumption setting is optimal. For instance, 
for the quadratic example described in the paper, from period-0 perspective, full 
centralization is always optimal.
Example 4 (Quadratic Costs—Period-0 Welfare): Consider the environment of 
Example 3. Figure 5 is the analogue of Figure 4—it depicts the period-0 welfare 
levels generated by the different processes as a function of the median agent’s pref-
erences.34 As can be seen, from period-0 perspective, full centralization is always 
optimal. Nonetheless, mandating commitment alone can generate greater period-0 
welfare than the full decentralization when there are sufficiently many agents who 
are very impatient.
VI. General Dynamic Decisions
Some of the insights highlighted by our model are shared by more general set-
tings with time-inconsistent voters. Indeed, suppose, quite generally, that at  t = 1, 
agents choose menus of actions for  t = 2 of the form  A ⊂ 핉 from a set . There 
is a default menu  A 0 and a switch to any menu  A ≠  A 0 entails a cost  c(A) > 0 (and  c( A 0 ) = 0 ). We assume that for any  A 1 ≠  A 2 ,  c( A 1 ) ≠ c( A 2 ) , i.e., there is a 
unique mapping between costs and menus. At  t = 2, agents choose an action from 
the menu selected in period  1 . That is, they choose an action  a ∈ A. 
For instance, in our tree-cutting context, we could consider  A 0 = [0, 1] and a 
commitment technology that generates a cap on consumption. That is, for a cost 
 c( x –), consumption in period  1 would be constrained to the menu  A = [0,  x –] .
34 In analogy to Example 3, period-0 utility implies a weight of  β on each period’s instantaneous utility. We 
therefore normalize utilities by a factor of  3β . We note, however, that even absent normalization, the qualitative 
message remains the same—mandating only commitment, or only consumption, is suboptimal. 
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In order for a model of collective action to be nontrivial, the population needs to 
have heterogenous preferences. For simplicity, we assume here a continuum of agents 
parametrized by a preference type  β ∈  [0, 1] , with a continuous and positive density. 
An agent of type  β chooses action  a(β; A) at  t = 2 out of menu  A. Time-inconsistency 
implies that, at  t = 1 , an agent prefers to commit to some action  a ∈  A 0 rather than 
enter the dynamic process and end up choosing  a(β; A) at a cost  c(A). 
In this setting, we can study the effects of collective action, much as in the special 
case we focused on throughout the paper. At  t = 1, each candidate  i offers a menu 
A i , and the menu achieving majority support prevails. At  t = 2 , collective action 
is defined through simple majority rule as we have assumed throughout, though 
actions are confined to belonging to the menu that was selected in period  1 .
The observation that centralization at  t = 1 combined with decentralization at 
t = 2 generates lower welfare than full decentralization follows immediately (even 
absent time-inconsistency). Indeed, agents in the fully decentralized setting can 
always emulate collective decisions at  t = 1 . This generality may make one won-
der why we analyze the centralized commitment, decentralized consumption setting 
at all. The reason is that we believe this setting is close in spirit to many applications 
and our formulation allows us to illustrate some natural comparative statics on the 
equilibrium that emerges in such settings. Furthermore, it allows us to identify more 
precisely the impacts of welfare considerations at  t = 0 , when only  t = 1 central-
ization can be useful.
Suppose we further assume a minimal well-behavedness condition on preferences: 
at  t = 2 , preferences are single-peaked and for each  A ,  a(β; A) is monotonic in  β .
Figure 5. Period-0 Welfare in the Quadratic Case
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Many of the observations we make throughout the paper carry through to this 
more general setting. For instance, under decentralization at  t = 1 and centraliza-
tion at  t = 2 , all choosing no investment at  t = 1, i.e., remaining with menu  A 0 
and allowing the median agent of type  β M to select the action  a( β M ;  A 0 ) , constitutes 
an equilibrium. That is, collective action at  t = 1 undermines the median agent’s 
ability to commit. Suppose that left to her own devices, the median agent would 
select menu  A M in period 1. As long as  a( β M ;  A M ) (at a cost of  c( A M ) ) is preferred 
in terms of welfare to  a( β M ;  A 0 ) , full centralization is superior to centralization only 
in period  2 .
Let’s consider the special case of consumption caps for period 2 in our original 
setting and discuss how political competition determines the choice of such caps 
in period 1 , when consumption choices are decentralized in period 2. Our general 
setting translates into the following: in period 1, candidate  i proposes a cap  x –i on the 
fraction of the tree that can be consumed by any individual. If a candidate proposing 
x – wins, then all voters can choose to consume  x ∈ [0,  x –] in period  2 . We assume 
that consumption caps are costly, with a cost of  
_
 x denoted by  c ( x –) assumed to be 
decreasing in  x – to capture the idea that a looser cap is easier to enforce. In particular, 
c(1) = 0 , so the cost of a non-binding cap is nil. As mentioned, in period 2, each 
agent can choose to consume a (nonnegative) amount  x ≤  x –. Denote by  x –(β) the 
ideal point from the perspective of an agent of type  β in period 1. Note first that for 
agents with  β ≥   v 2  __ v 3 , consumption caps are never binding since these agents choose to 
consume zero in period 2. Therefore,  x –(β) = 1 for  β ≥   v 2  __ v 3 and hence these agents, 
with mass  1 − g (  v 2  __ v 3 ) , always vote for the highest (least costly) consumption cap. Of 
course, if this mass of voters forms a majority, then there cannot be any investment 
in consumption caps in equilibrium. Assume, then, that  g (  v 2  __ v 3 ) >  1 _2. Observe that 
for agents with  β <   v 2  __ v 3 , any consumption cap  x – < 1 is binding, since, absent any 
commitment, these agents choose to consume the entire tree in period 2. Figure 6 
depicts  x –(β) . Because, from the perspective of period-1 selves, the desired period-2 
consumption decreases with  β , this implies that  x –(β) is decreasing in  β (tighter 
caps) for  β <   v 2  __ v 3 . Let  β ˆ be such that  g  (  v 2  __ v 3 ) − g( β ˆ ) = 1/2 . That is, half the pop-
ulation has preferences that are between  β ˆ and   v 2  __ v 3 . Type  β ˆ is the pivotal agent in this 
environment, so the equilibrium level of consumption caps is  x –( β ˆ ). It follows, and 
depicted in Figure 6, that  β ˆ is lower than the median  β and lower than  β cD (the piv-
otal agent in the CD scenario).
VII. Conclusions
The paper considers a simple setting in which behavioral agents, who in our case 
suffer from present bias, are also political actors, electing the government that is 
charged with “solving” their behavioral biases. While commitment instruments can 
be beneficial to individuals left to their own devices, we show the sensitivity of col-
lective outcomes to the precise timing in which political processes take place and the 
underlying distribution of biases in the population. Commitment levels are lowest 
when only consumption is mandated. Under some regularity assumptions, commit-
ment is highest when it alone is subject to collective action. When both  commitment 
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and consumption decisions are decided upon collectively, they reflect the prefer-
ences of the individual with median present-bias preferences.
From a welfare perspective, there is a complementarity between centralization 
at the commitment and consumption stages. Indeed, we show that either full cen-
tralization or full decentralization generate the highest welfare. Full centralization 
can be beneficial when there is a virtuous median voter. In that case, centralization 
effectively allows the population to delegate decisions to a virtuous agent.
These results are potentially relevant for many settings. One notable example 
is the design of pension systems in the United States and abroad. Indeed, a pub-
lic pension system is sometimes defended as an effective solution to under-saving 
driven by self-control problems. Our results suggest that an analysis of the collective 
action of self-control is an important aspect of the design of such pension systems. 
A careful study of the design of a pension system for agents subject to self-control 
problems requires many specific details that are missing from our model. However, 
such design needs to take into consideration the political constraints imposed by 
those same individuals who are prone to self-control problems and comprise the 
electorate. These constraints may in principle affect the choice between a pay-as-
you-go system and a funded system, the safeguards that are embedded in the system, 
as well as the timing and response of the system to demographic shocks. We view 
this as an important potential avenue for future research.
There are two important assumptions that underlie our analysis. First, we assume 
that agents are time-inconsistent across periods of political decision making. The 
classical  β − δ model does not specify the length of the time period for which 
Mass of 1/2
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Figure 6. Voting on Consumption Caps
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 lowered discount factors kick in. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the body of the 
paper, there is evidence supporting the idea that time-inconsistency might be very 
relevant for political contexts (see also Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv 2015). Second, we 
take a partial equilibrium approach in that the costs of commitment we analyze do 
not depend on the volume of demand for commitment. A more elaborate analysis of 
markets for commitment is left for future research.
From a broader perspective, accounts of behavioral biases have generated a 
rich literature that, by and large, focuses on individual actions. The paper offers 
some first steps to studies that allow for these same biases when considering  policy 
 determination, either ones that attempt at overcoming these biases (such as in the 
case of retirement savings) or otherwise. In particular, it suggests the potential 
importance of considering different biases (e.g., overconfidence, belief distortions in 
general, limited memory, etc.) as well as different types of policies (e.g., debt limits, 
general upholding of political promises, etc.) when inspecting political processes.35
Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
Consider the intermediate region of  β parameters:
  β ∈  [ ( v 2 −  ∂ k (1, c)  _______∂ x ) / v 3 ,  ( v 2 −  ∂ k (0, c)  _______∂ x ) / v 3 ) . 
Since  
 ∂ 2 k (x (c, β) , c) __________ ∂ x ∂ c > 0 , increasing  c leads to an increase in the right-hand side of the 
first-order condition specified in (1). Since   ∂ 2 k (x (c, β) , c) __________ ∂ x 2  > 0 , it follows that  x(c, β) 
is decreasing in  c. Similarly, notice that  
d ( v 2 − β  v 3 )  _______
dβ < 0 so that the left-hand side of 
the first-order condition is decreasing in  β. The assumption that   ∂ 2 k (x (c, β) , c) __________ ∂ x 2  > 0 
then assures that  x(c, β) is decreasing in  β. Now, notice that since   ∂ 2 k (x, c)  ______∂ x ∂ c > 0, 
 ( v 2 −  ∂ k (1, c)  ______∂ x ) /  v 3 and  ( v 2 −  ∂ k (0, c)  ______∂ x ) / v 3 are decreasing in  c. The lemma’s claim 
then follows. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
Lemma 2 assures that, under our regularity assumption,  c(β) > 0 for all 
 β ∈  ( β _,   v 2  __ v 3 ) . Furthermore, since we assume that fundamentals are such that  x(c, β) 
is well-behaved;  c(β) is continuous.
35 As mentioned, some recent work has started moving in that direction. For example, Ortoleva and Snowberg 
(2015) study the impacts of overconfidence, while Diermeier and Li (2015) consider impacts on reelection and 
effort put by politicians who are facing voters with limited memory and an inclination to persist with their past 
voting behavior. 
VoL. 9 no. 3 239Lizzeri and Yariv: CoLLeCtive SeLf-ControL
If  1 − g(  v 2  __ v 3 ) ≥ 1/2, there is a majority of agents who prefer no commitment 
and the equilibrium commitment parameter is  c cD = 0, which coincides with that 
preferred by the median.
Suppose instead that  1 − g(  v 2  __ v 3 ) < 1/2. Let  B( c ̃) =  {β | c(β) ≤  c ̃} . From 
Lemma 2, agents have single-peaked preferences. Therefore, for any  c ̃, all agents of 
type  β ∈ B( c ̃) strictly prefer commitment level  c ̃ to any commitment level  c >  c ̃. 
For any  0 <  c 1 <  c 2 ≤  max β  c(β),  B( c 1 ) ⊊ B( c 2 ). Therefore, continuity of  c(β) 
assures that there exists a unique  c cD such that  g(B( c cD )) = 1/2. For any param-
eter  c >  c cD , there is a strict majority preferring lower commitment, while for any 
 c <  c cD , there is a strict majority preferring greater commitment. It follows that 
c cD defines the unique equilibrium commitment level.
When  1 − g  (  v 2  __ v 3 ) < 1/2 and  c(β) has a unique maximum, there exist  β L ,  β H ∈  ( β _,   v 2  __ v 3 ) such that  B( c cD ) =  [ β _,  β L ] ∪  [ β H ,  
_ β] . Since  g is continuous and 
 g( β L ) +  (1 − g( β L )) = 1/2 , we have that  g( β L ) < 1/2 and  1 − g( β H ) < 1/2. It follows that  β M ∈  ( β L ,  β H ) . Notice that  c cD = c( β L ) = c( β H ). It fol-
lows that  β cD =  β H >  β M .  ∎ 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 
Let us first consider the case in which  x (c,  β M ) is interior. 
From the first-order condition of the median voter in period  2 , we know that 
whenever  x (c,  β M ) > 0, 
  v 2 −  β M  v 3 =  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   _____________∂ x . 
Consider the effect of  c on an agent of taste parameter  β who foresees that period- 
2 decisions will be made by the median voter:
  
∂ u 1  ____∂ c =  
∂ x (c,  β M )  ________∂ c (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) − β  
∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   _____________∂ c 
 − β  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   _____________∂ x  ∂ x (c,  β M )  ________∂ c −  i ′ (c) . 
The first-order condition for  β M implies that
  v 2 −  v 3 = − (1 −  β M )  v 3 +  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   _____________∂ x 
and so
  
∂ u 1  ____∂ c = −β ( ∂ x (c,  β M )  ________∂ c (1 −  β M )  v 3 +  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   _____________∂ c ) − i′ (c) . 
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Now, if  
∂ x (c,  β M )  _______∂ c (1 −  β M )  v 3 +  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   __________∂ c ≥ 0, all agents prefer  c = 0 and the 
claim follows. Otherwise,  
∂ x (c,  β M )  _______∂ c (1 −  β M )  v 3 +  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)   __________∂ c < 0 and  ∂ u 1  ___∂ c is 
increasing in  β. At a maximum,  u 1 is (weakly) concave and the claim follows.
We now consider the cases in which  x(c,  β M ) may be at a corner solution. Note 
first that when  β M ≥   v 2  __ v 3 , then  x(c,  β M ) = 0 for all  c . In this case, all agents prefer 
c = 0 in period  1 and the claim follows. More generally, we have








c ≥  c H ( β M ) 
     ( v 2 −  β M  v 3 ) =  ∂ k (x (c,  β M ) , c)  __________∂ x    c L ( β M ) < c <  c H ( β M )  
1  c ≤  c L ( β M ) 
 . 
Clearly, there is no value in choosing  c >  c H ( β M ) . Thus,  c ≥  c H ( β M ) and
  u 1 (β,  c H ( β M ) ) = β  v 3 − i ( c H ( β M ) ) . 
Comparing this to interior cases:
  u 1 (β,  c H ( β M ) ) −  u 1 (β, c) = β  v 3 − i ( c H ( β M ) ) − β  v 3 + x (c,  β M )  (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) 
 − βk (x (c,  β M ) , c) − i (c) 
 = β (x (c,  β M )  ( v 3 −  v 2 ) − k (x (c,  β M ) , c) ) 
 −  (i ( c H ( β M ) ) − i (c) ) . 
If  c H ( β M ) is optimal for some  β ˆ , it has to be the case that
  β ˆ (x (c,  β M )  ( v 3 −  v 2 ) − k (x (c,  β M ) , c) ) >  (i ( c H ( β M ) ) − i (c) ) ,
for all  c <  c H ( β M ) . But then, this also holds for all  β >  β ˆ .
It is easy to see that it must be the case that when  c ≤  c L ( β M ) , then the optimal  c 
is zero: there is no point in investing anything in commitment if it does not help. In 
this case, the payoff in the first period is  u 1 (β, 0) =  v 2 . Comparing this to interior 
cases:
   u 1 (β,  c H ( β M ) ) −  u 1 (β, c) = β  v 2 −  (β  v 3 + x (c,  β M )  (β  v 2 − β  v 3 ) 
 − βk (x (c,  β M ) , c) − i (c) ) 
 = −β ( ( v 3 −  v 2 )  (1 − x (c,  β M ) ) 
 − k (x (c,  β M ) , c) ) + i (c) . 
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If a choice of zero commitment is optimal for some  β ˆ , it has to be the case that
  β ˆ ( ( v 3 −  v 2 )  (1 − x (c,  β M ) ) − k (x (c,  β M ) , c) ) < i (c) ,
for all  c >  c L ( β M ) . But then this also holds for all  β <  β ̂.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
Investment in commitment is beneficial to an individual voter only if the invest-
ment changes the consumption decision in the second period. However, no individ-
ual agent is pivotal in the second period. Hence, consumption choices in the second 
period are not responsive to individual investment decisions. Thus, the optimal level 
of investment in equilibrium is zero.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
 (i) Whenever  β M ≥  β ∗ , in the fully centralized system there is fully delayed 
consumption,  x(c( β M ),  β M ) = 0 even with no commitment,  c( β M ) = 0 . 
In particular, since  k(x, 0) = 0, any agent of preference parameter  β 
 experiences a period- 1 utility of  β  v 3 . In contrast, in the fully decentralized 
system, while all agents with  β ≥  β ∗ experience the same period-1 utility 
as in the fully centralized system, agents with  β ∈ ( β _,  β ∗ ) choose  c(β) > 0 
at a cost of  i(c(β)) > 0 (as well as potentially some early consumption); 
hence, they receive a utility that is strictly lower than  β  v 3 . Since the distribu-
tion  g is continuous and  g( β ∗ ) > 0, the result follows.
 (ii) Consider a sequence of distributions  { g n } n=1 ∞ such that there exists  β ̃ >  β _ for 
which  { g n ( β ̃ )} is uniformly bounded below  1 and  lim n→∞   β M n =  β _. Under 
full centralization, continuity implies that for any  ε > 0, there exists  n ̃(ε) 
such that for any  n >  n ̃(ε) , for all  β, period- 1 utility under full centraliza-
tion,  u 1 cc (β; n) satisfies:
    u 1 cc (β; n) < β ( v 2 x (c( β _),  β _) +  v 3 (1 − x (c( β _),  β _) ) ) − i (c ( β _) ) + ε. 
  By Lemma 2,  c(β) > 0 for all  β <  β ∗ . Hence, under full decentralization, 
from Lemma 1,  x (c ( β _) , β) is strictly decreasing in  β. Since agents can always 
choose  c ( β _) themselves, it follows that for sufficiently small  ε, there exists β(ε) ∈ ( β _,  β ̃ ) such that for any  β ≥ β(ε) , and any  n >  n ̃(ε), decentralized 
choices generate  first-period utility  u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β) satisfying
  u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β) −  u 1 cc (β; n) > 0. 
  Furthermore,  lim ε→0  β(ε) =  β _ and for sufficiently small  ε > 0, for any β ≥  β ̃ ,   n >  n ̃(ε), 
  u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β) −  u 1 cc (β; n) > Δ > 0. 
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  Suppose then that  g n ( β ̃ ) ≤ γ < 1 for all  n. For sufficiently small  ε, it fol-
lows that:
  ∫  β _ β(ε)   u 1 cc (β; n) _________1 + 2β d  g n (β) <  ∫  β _ β(ε)   u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β)  ________________ 1 + 2β d  g n (β)
 +  ∫  β ̃   _ β  Δ _____ 1 + 2β d  g n (β). 
  In particular, for any  n >  n ∗ = n(ε), where  ε is sufficiently small, welfare 
satisfies
     Π cc =  ∫  β _  _ β   u 1 cc (β; n) _________1 + 2β d g n (β) 
 <  ∫  β _ β(ε)   u 1 cc (β; n) _________1 + 2β d g n (β) +  ∫ β(ε)  β ̃    u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β)  ________________ 1 + 2β d g n (β)  
 +  ∫  β ̃   _ β   u 1 (x(c, β), c(β), β) − Δ   __________________1 + 2β d  g n (β) <  Π DD . 
  In fact,
     Π cc =  ∫  β _  _ β   u 1 cc (β; n) _________1 + 2β d  g n (β) 
 <  ∫  β _ β(ε)   u 1 cc (β; n) − ε  ___________1 + 2β d  g n (β) 
 +  ∫ β(ε)  _ β   u 1 cc (β) − ε + Δ  ___________ 1 + 2β d  g n (β) <  Π DD . ∎ 
REFERENCES
Ayres, Ian. 2010. carrots and Sticks: unlock the Power of incentives to get Things Done. New York: 
Bantam Books.
Babor, Thomas, Raul Caetano, Sally Casswell, Griffith Edwards, Norman Giesbrecht, Kathryn 
Graham, Joel Grube, et al. 2003. Alcohol: no ordinary commodity: research and Public Policy. 
1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 121 (2): 699–746.
Bendor, Jonathan, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting. 2011. A Behavioral Theory 
of Elections. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Benjamin, Daniel J., and David I. Laibson. 2003. “Good Policies For Bad Governments: Behavioral 
Political Economy.” Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s Behavioral Econom-
ics Conference, Boston, MA, June 8–10.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Antonio Rangel. 2009. “Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theo-
retic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (1): 
51–104.
VoL. 9 no. 3 243Lizzeri and Yariv: CoLLeCtive SeLf-ControL
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. 2011. “Behavioral econom-
ics perspectives on public sector pension plans.” Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 10 (2): 315–36.
Bisin, Alberto, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Leeat Yariv. 2015. “Government Policy with Time Inconsistent 
Voters.” American Economic review 105 (6): 1711–37.
Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds. 2004. Advances in Behavioral Eco-
nomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the rational Voter: Why Democracies choose Bad Policies. Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press.
DellaVigna, Stefano. 2009. “Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 47 (2): 315–72.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2006. “Paying Not to Go to the Gym.” American Eco-
nomic review 96 (3): 694–719.
Diermeier, Daniel, and Christopher Li. 2015. “Electoral Control with Behavioral Voters.” https://www.
aeaweb.org/conference/2015/retrieve.php?pdfid=35.
Dobkin, Carlos, and Steven L. Puller. 2007. “The effects of government transfers on monthly cycles 
in drug abuse, hospitalization and mortality.” Journal of Public Economics 91 (11–12): 2137–57.
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue. 2002. “Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2): 351–401.
Glaeser, Edward L. 2006. “Paternalism and Psychology.” university of chicago Law review 73 (1): 
133–56.
Gottlieb, Daniel. 2008. “Competition over Time-Inconsistent Consumers.” Journal of Public Economic 
Theory 10 (4): 673–84.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2001. “Temptation and Self-Control.” Econometrica 69 (6): 
1403–35.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2004. “Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption.” Econo-
metrica 72 (1): 119–58.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2007. “Harmful Addiction.” review of Economic Studies 74 (1): 147–72.
Halac, Marina, and Pierre Yared. 2014. “Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks.” Econo-
metrica 82 (5): 1557–1614.
Hiedhues, Paul, and Botond Ko˝szegi. 2010. “Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Mar-
ket.” American Economic review 100 (5): 2279–2303.
Hwang, Jisoo, and Johanna Möllerström. 2014. “Design of Reforms with Time-Inconsistent Voters.” 
Unpublished.
Jackson, Matthew O., and Leeat Yariv. 2015. “Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time 
Inconsistency.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (4): 150–78.
Jacobs, Alan M. 2011. governing for the Long Term: Democracy and the Politics of investment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krusell, Per, Burhanettin Kurus¸çu, and Anthony A. Smith. 2002. “Equilibrium Welfare and Govern-
ment Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting.” Journal of Economic Theory 105 (1): 42–72.
Krusell, Per, Burhanettin Kurus¸çu, and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. 2010. “Temptation and Taxation.” 
Econometrica 78 (6): 2063–84.
Lagunoff, Roger. 2008. “Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institu-
tions.” http://faculty.georgetown.edu/lagunofr/dynam-polit-b.pdf.
Laibson, David. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112 (2): 443–78.
Laibson, David I., Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman. 1998. “Self-Control and Saving for Retire-
ment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 28 (1): 91–196.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. “Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of 
political competition.” Public choice 52 (3): 273–97.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 1999. “Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic review 
89 (1): 103–24.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 2000. “The economics of immediate gratification.” Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making 13 (2): 233–50.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “Optimal sin taxes.” Journal of Public Economics 90 (10–11): 1825–49.
Ortoleva, Pietro, and Erik Snowberg. 2015. “Overconfidence in Political Behavior.” American Eco-
nomic review 105 (2): 504–35.
244 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMicS AuguST 2017
Osborne, Martin J., and Al Slivinski. 1996. “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen- 
Candidates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1): 65–96.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. Macroeconomic Policy, credibility and Politics. Funda-
mentals of Pure and Applied Economics. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Phelps, E. S., and R. A. Pollack. 1968. “On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium 
Growth.” review of Economic Studies 35 (2): 185–99.
Piguillem, Facundo, and Alessandro Riboni. 2015. “Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through 
Disagreement.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (2): 901–49.
Rizzo, Mario J., and Douglas Glen Whitman. 2009a. “The Knowledge Problem of the New Paternal-
ism.” Brigham Young university Law review 2009 (4): 905–68.
Rizzo, Mario J., and Douglas Glen Whitman. 2009b. “Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism 
on the Slippery Slopes.” Arizona Law review 51 (3): 685–739.
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (4): 1169–89.
Shapiro, Jesse M. 2005. “Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle.” 
Journal of Public Economics 89 (2–3): 303–25.
Stephens, Melvin, Jr. 2003. “‘3rd of tha Month’: Do Social Security Recipients Smooth Consumption 
between Checks?” American Economic review 93 (1): 406–22.
Strotz, R. H. 1955. “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization.” review of Eco-
nomic Studies 23 (3): 165–80.
Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina. 1990. “Voting on the Budget Deficit.” American Economic 
review 80 (1): 37–49.
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. nudge: improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness. New York: Penguin Books.
